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Abstract 
 
In recent years considerable progress has been made on improving the efficiency and accuracy of 
the fault tree methodology.  The majority of fault trees produced to model industrial systems can 
now be analysed very quickly on PC computers.  However there can still be problems with very 
large fault tree structures such as those developed to model nuclear and aerospace systems.  If the 
fault tree consists of a large number of basic events and gates and many of the events are 
repeated, possibly several times within the structure, then the processing of the full problem may 
not be possible.  In such circumstances the problem has to be reduced to a manageable size by 
discarding the less significant failure modes in the qualitative evaluation to produce only the most 
relevant minimal cut sets and approximations used to obtain the top event probability or 
frequency. 
 
The method proposed uses a combination of analysis options each of which reduces the 
complexity of the problem.  A factorisation technique is first applied which is designed to reduce 
the ‘noise’ from the tree structure.  Wherever possible, events which always appear together in 
the tree are combined together to create more complex, higher level events.  A solution of the 
now reduced problem can always be expanded back out in terms of the original events.  The 
second stage is to identify independent sections of the fault tree which can be analysed separately.  
Finally the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) technique is used to perform the quantification.  
Careful selection of the ordering applied to the basic events (variables) will again aid the 
efficiency of the process. 
 
Introduction 
 
For systems with many components and a high degree of complexity, fault trees (ref. 1) generated 
to represent the causes of specified system failure modes may be too large to solve efficiently.  
Converting the fault tree logic structure to the alternative form of the binary decision diagram 
(BDD) (ref. 2) can enable an efficient and accurate solution to be obtained (refs. 3-4).  However, 
the conversion process requires the basic events to be placed in an ordering.  If the ordering is a 
good one the conversion process will result in a concise form of the BDD.  With a poor ordering 
selection the size of the BDD may explode exponentially with the number of variables.  Despite 
much work carried out to date (refs. 5-8) on methods to order the basic events there is no 
universally accepted approach to the ordering and the structure of some fault trees means that 
efficient orderings may not exist. 
 
Generally it is true that the smaller the fault tree structure the less sensitive it is to the ordering 
selected with reasonable orderings producing a manageable BDD.  Two methods exist which can 
be used to reduce the analysis of large fault trees to that of solving smaller structures.  The first 
method is that of combining basic events together to form ‘complex’ events.  The fault tree 
structure is then reduced in size by expressing the system failure mode in terms of the ‘complex’ 
events.  This method was used in the FAUNET computer code developed in the 1970s (ref. 9).  
Reduction in this way removes the ‘noise’ from the fault tree but retains the relevant structure - 
this effectively forms very small modules of the fault tree.  The second method identifies larger 
modules in the fault tree.  Modules are independent sections of the failure logic diagram which 
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can be analysed separately and the results combined together to make predictions for the top 
event.  Modularisation can provide very efficient solutions reducing large problems to the 
analysis of small manageable units.  The most efficient means of identifying the modules is a 
method produced by Rauzy and Dutuit (ref. 10). 
 
When analysing the modules a binary decision diagram method is used.  This paper shows how 
the above approach is used to predict the system failure probability and system failure frequency 
when the failure mode is represented by a large, complex fault tree. 
 
Binary Decision Diagrams 
 
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is illustrated in figure 1. 
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Figure 1- Binary Decision Diagram Structure 
 
The diagram is entered at the root vertex.  Each vertex or node represents a basic event from the 
fault tree and has two exit branches below it.  If the event occurs then the node is left on the 1 
branch.  For the non-occurrence of the basic event the node is left on the 0 branch.  When the set 
of component conditions is such that the top event is determined then a terminal-one node or a 
terminal-zero node occurs.  A terminal-one vertex indicates top event occurrence and a terminal-
zero vertex is the top event non-occurrence.  This encodes the structure function of the fault tree.  
Each node in the BDD can be written as an ite format.  This stands for if-then-else and is an 
ordered triple with a variable, a pointer to the one-branch and a pointer to the zero-branch, so 
ite(A,f1,f2) can be interpreted as: 
if A 
then    consider function f1 
else     consider function f2. 
 
The entire BDD in figure 1 can be expressed using this notation as: 
 
ite(A, 1, ite(B, ite(C, 1, 0), 0)) 
 
Cut sets are combinations of component failures which cause the top event.  On the BDD these 
can be tracked as component failure events which lead to a terminal-one vertex.  So  the BDD in 
figure 1 has cut sets A and BC.  In this case the cut sets are minimal.  However the significant 
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advantage to transforming the fault tree to the BDD form is gained when  quantifying the top 
event probability and failure intensity.   These can be obtained directly fro the BDD without need 
to produce a list of the minimal cut sets as an intermediate stage or resort to approximations. 
 
The list of events contained on the Np paths , through the BDD to a terminal-one, Ci, taking 
account of both success and failure states of the components, are disjoint (contain mutually 
exclusive sets of events). For the top event probability, Qsys,  then: 
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The system failure intensity, wsys(t), can be calculated from: 
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where ))(( tGi q is the criticality function ( the probability that the system is in a critical state for 
component i such that the failure of i causes the system to pass from the working to the failed 
state) and )(twi is the failure intensity for each of the n components. 
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where ),1( qisysQ is the probability of system failure with qi=1 and ),0( qisysQ is the probability 
of system failure with qi=0.  An efficient method to calculate the criticality function (equation 3) 
for each component is given in ref 11 and considers the probabilities of the path sections of the 
BDD up to and after the nodes of each variable xi resulting in the following equation. 
 
))](())(())[(())(( 01 tpotpotprtG
iii xxxi
qqqq
ix
nodes
-= å            (4) 
where ))(( tpr
ix
q  is the probability of the path section from the root vertex to the node xi;  
))((1 tpo
ix
q is the probability of the path section from the ‘1’ branch of the node xi to a terminal-
one node;  ))((0 tpo
ix
q is the probability of the path section from the ‘0’ branch of the node xi to a 
terminal-one node.  The summation is over all xi nodes in the BDD. 
 
Fault Tree to BDD Conversion Process 
 
Details of the conversion process are well covered in other papers2,3 and so will only be 
summarised here. The conversion is carried out pair-wise in a bottom-up procedure.  Where a Å 
gate is encountered, where Å is either AND or OR,  with inputs: 
G = ite(X, G1, G2) and H = ite(Y, H1, H2) 
 
then if  X < Y then    G Å H = ite(X, G1 Å H, G2 Å H) 
or if     X = Y then     G Å H = ite(X, G1 Å H1, G2 Å H2) 
 
 
 
PROCEEDINGS of the 21st INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE - 2003
377
 
Fault Tree Reduction 
 
Stage 1 – Fault Tree Factorisation:  The first stage of the fault tree reduction is to represent the 
basic logic structure with as little ‘noise’ as possible.  This is achieved by a 3-stage process for 
which the basic elements of the procedure are given in reference 9.  The stages are: 
Contraction: Subsequent gates of the same type are contracted into a single gate.  This structures 
the fault tree as an alternating sequence of AND and OR gates. 
Factorisation: Pairs of events which always occur together in the same gate type are replaced 
with a ‘complex event’.  For identification purposes this is given a numerical label from 2000 
upwards. 
Extraction: Structures of the type shown in figure 2 are identified and restructured as indicated. 
A B A C
A
B C
A B A C
A
B C  
Figure 2 -  Extraction structures 
 
The three stages are applied repeatedly until no further reduction in the fault tree structure can be 
achieved. 
B C D R B C E S H F I J K G N M
A A
TOP
G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13
G4 G5 G6 G7F G
G1 G2 G3
 
Figure 3 - Example Fault Tree 
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As an example of the methodology presented it will be applied to the fault tree shown in figure 3.  
The fault tree has 15 basic events many of which are repeated in the tree structure.  This fault tree 
is small by real standards but can be used to demonstrate the method for analysis. As an 
indication of the size of the problem this fault tree has 54 minimal cut sets.  The top down, left to 
right ordering of the basic events considers the fault tree one level at a time and passes left to 
right placing any events, not previously encountered, in the ordering list.  As such the first level at 
which basic events are encountered features basic events F and G.  Ordering from left to right 
places F and G as the first two events in the ordering.  Progressing to the next level adds event A 
to the list.  Finally the bottom row of the fault tree  produces an ordering of the basic events: 
F<G<A<B<C<D<R<E<S<H<I<J<K<N<M 
The BDD for the fault tree produced with this ordering is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 - BDD for example fault tree 
 
The BDD has a total of 40 non-terminal nodes.  Each branch leaving an intermediate node on the 
left is a one-branch and the right branch is a zero-branch. 
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Considering the factorisation process for the fault tree in figure 1 requires the stages of 
contraction, factorisation and extraction to be repeatedly and sequentially applied.  The first 
application of contraction does not change the fault tree structure as it is already and alternating 
sequence of AND and OR gates.  Factorisation produces the following pairs of events which 
always occur under the same gate type: 
 
2000=B+C 2002=E+S 2004=N+M 
       2001=D+R 2003=I+J 
 
By then applying extraction to gate G1, followed by a contraction stage and then factorisation to 
produce: 
 
2005=2000+2001 2006=2005+2002 2007=A.2006 
 
No further reduction is possible and the fault tree shown in figure 5 results.   
TOP
2007 G2 G3
F GG6 G7
20042003 G12G10
H F K G
 
Figure 5 - Reduced Fault Tree Structure 
 
 
Ordering the variables in a top-down, left-right manner provides an ordering:   
2007 < F < G < 2003 < 2004 < H < K 
The fault tree – BDD conversion process yields the BDD illustrated in figure 6.  A reduction in 
the magnitude of the problem has already been produced as the BDD has only 11 intermediate 
nodes compared to 40 in the original BDD. 
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Figure 6 - BDD for the Factorised Fault Tree 
 
Stage-2 Modularisation:  This second stage of the reduction identifies subtrees which are 
completely independent of the rest of the structure.  The method for identifying the modules was 
developed by Rauzy and Dutuit10.  Once identified the modules can be analysed separately and 
the results substituted back into the remaining structure for the top event to make predictions on 
the system performance.   
 
To find modules two depth-first traversals of the fault tree are made.  The first performs a step-
by-step visit to each gate and event recording the step number for the first, second and final visits.  
The step number for the second visit to each event is always the same as the first visit.  To 
illustrate the method consider the fault tree shown in figure 5.  Starting at the top gate and 
progressing through the structure in a depth-first manner means that the gates and events are 
encountered in the order shown in table 1.  Where a gate has both basic events and other gates as 
inputs the basic events are always considered first. 
 
step Gate/event step Gate/event step Gate/event 
1 TOP 9 F 17 G12 
2 2007 10 G10 18 K 
3 G2 11 G6 19 G 
4 F 12 G2 20 G12 
5 G6 13 G3 21 G7 
6 2003 14 G 22 G3 
7 G10 15 G7 23 TOP 
8 H 16 2004   
Table 1 -  Steps through the fault tree shown in figure 5 
 
PROCEEDINGS of the 21st INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE - 2003
381
Each gate is visited at least twice, once on the way down and again on the way back up the tree.  
Once a gate has been visited it can be visited again, but the depth first traversal beneath that gate 
is not repeated.  The step numbers for visits for the gates are shown in table 2 and the events in 
table 3. 
 
 TOP G2 G3 G6 G7 G10 G12 
First visit 1 3 13 5 15 7 17 
Second visit 23 12 22 11 21 10 20 
Final visit 23 12 22 11 21 10 20 
Min of first visits of inputs 2 4 14 4 14 4 14 
Max of final visits of inputs 22 11 21 10 20 9 19 
Module Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Table 2 - Gate visit summary 
 
 2007 F 2003 H G 2004 K 
First visit 2 4 6 8 14 16 18 
Second visit 2 4 6 8 14 16 18 
Final visit 2 9 6 8 19 16 18 
Table 3 - Basic Event visit summary 
 
The second pass of the fault tree finds the maximum of the final visits and the minimum of the 
first visits of any gates or basic events which appear at any level below the gate (see table 2). 
 
The principal of the algorithm is that if any descendent of a gate has a first visit step number 
smaller than the first visit step number of the gate then it must have appeared before it in the tree 
structure.  Conversely if any descendent of a gate has a final visit number larger than the final 
visit number of the gate then it must have appeared after the gate in the traversal.  Therefore a 
gate can be identified as heading a module only if: 
¨ the first visit to each of its descendents is after the first visit to the gate and 
¨ the last visit to each of its descendents is before the last visit to the gate. 
 
From table 2 it can be seen that the modules are headed by the events:  TOP, G2 and G3. 
 
The fault tree in figure 5 then reduces to solving the fault tree modules shown in figure 7.  The 
BDDs for these modules, when the basic events are ordered in a top-down, left-right manner, are 
illustrated in figure 8. 
TOP
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Figure 7 -  Modularised fault trees 
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Figure 8 - BDDs for Fault Tree Modules 
 
  
The problem has now reduced to solving BDDs with a combined total of 9 intermediate nodes.  
Much smaller than the original problem.  In this small example the reduction in complexity is not 
critical for larger fault tree structures this can be essential for a solution. 
 
Top Event Quantification 
 
For any BDD consisting of only basic events the method for calculating the top event probability 
or failure intensity was described earlier.  This section describes how this methodology can be 
extended to account for BDDs which feature complex events or modules. 
 
 
 
 
Top Event probability 
 
First the failure probability of the complex events and modular events is calculated.  For complex 
event XC with inputs X1 and X2,  then: 
 
For an AND gate   21qqqC =  
For an OR gate  2121 qqqqqC -+=  
 
The calculation for the modular events is the same as that described for calculating the probability 
of a complete BDD.  Probabilities of failure for complex events and other modular events 
contained in the structure being analysed are necessarily evaluated first.  When all complex 
events and modular events have been quantified then the BDD representing the top event can then 
be evaluated. 
 
Top Event Frequency 
 
For a BDD containing only basic events, one pass through the BDD calculating the parameters 
contained in equation 4 enables the failure intensity to be calculated using equation 2.   
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For BDDs with complex events and modules the criticality function, Gi(q) for each basic event 
still needs to be calculated in order to use equation 2.  
 
Criticality function of basic events within complex events:   The criticality function can still be 
calculated using equation 4.  For this we need to know ))(( tprC q  ))((
1 tpoC q  ))((
0 tpoC q  for 
the complex events.  Since complex events can only be one of two forms, the BDDs are simply 
that of an AND gate or an OR gate.  When these are inserted into the original BDD they have the 
structures illustrated in figure 9 where the terminal 1 nodes are replaced by ))((1 tpoC q  and the 
terminal o nodes by ))((0 tpoC q .  The probability of the paths before the root node of the 
complex event BDD is ))(( tprC q  rather than 1. 
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Cpo0
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C
C
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Figure 9 - Complex event BDDs 
 
Using Figure 9 the values of ))(( tpr
ix
q  ))((1 tpo
ix
q  ))((0 tpo
ix
q  can be calculated for the 
variables X1 and X2 from: 
AND 
X1   
00
011
1
221
1
)1(
CX
CXCXX
CX
popo
poqpoqpo
prpr
=
-+=
=
 
 
X2  
00
11
2
2
12
CX
CX
XCX
popo
popo
qprpr
=
=
=
 
OR 
X1   
010
11
)1(
221
1
1
CXCXX
CX
CX
poqpoqpo
popo
prpr
-+=
=
=
 
 
PROCEEDINGS of the 21st INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM SAFETY CONFERENCE - 2003
384
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Events X1 and X2 may be either basic events or other complex events, this process is repeated 
until values have been calculated for all the basic events.  The criticality functions of the basic 
events are calculated using equation 3.  Complex events can occur more than once in the BDD in 
which case the criticality functions must be summed. 
 
Criticality function of basic events within modules:   Modules are treated in a similar way to the 
complex events.  The modular event has mpr as the prior probability to the root of the module. 
1
mpo is the probability which occurs at any terminal-one node on the module and 
0
mpo the 
probability of any terminal-zero node on the module.  The contributions for each component Xi: 
ix
pr 1
ix
po and 0
ix
po are then derived in terms of the similar quantities for the module.  This differs 
from the approach taken for the complex events only in that the structures of the modules are not 
predetermined.  Where modules appear more than once in the fault tree structure the calculations 
are repeated for each occurrence and the criticality contributions for the basic events summed. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A strategy has been produced which enables the analysis for large fault tree structures.  The 
approach makes use of the Binary Decision Diagram and its inherent accuracy and efficiency.  In 
breaking the analysis down into smaller sections by factorisation and modularisation, the 
selection of an appropriate variable ordering system for the BDDs becomes  less critical.  
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